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DISSECTING THE HYBRID RIGHTS EXCEPTION: SHOULD IT BE 
EXPANDED OR REJECTED? 
David L. Hudson, Jr.* and Emily H. Harvey** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted a 
high level of protection for religious liberty claims.1 The Court applied a 
version of strict scrutiny when evaluating governmental laws or regulations 
that burdened an individual’s free exercise of religion.2 In 1990, the Su-
preme Court reversed decades of precedent and fundamentally changed the 
meaning and application of the Free Exercise Clause. In Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, determined 
that the Free Exercise Clause does not protect individuals from laws that do 
not target specific religious beliefs or practices.3 However, Justice Scalia 
offered an exception for cases involving “hybrid rights.”4 
A “hybrid right” is one that involves both the Free Exercise Clause and 
another constitutional right.5 In the twenty-three years since the Smith deci-
sion, state and federal courts have grappled with the meaning and applica-
tion of the hybrid rights exception with no clarification from the Supreme 
Court. In the process, lower courts have developed at least three general 
approaches to hybrid rights—rejection, independent viability, and colorable 
claim.6 In some cases, courts arguably have used a fourth approach called 
the “cabining” approach, which limits application of hybrid rights to cases 
closely resembling the cases distinguished by the Court in Smith.7 
 
       *  J.D., Vanderbilt University; A.B., Duke University; Adjunct Professor of Law, First 
Amendment, Vanderbilt Law School and the Nashville School of Law. He is a co-editor of 
the Encyclopedia of the First Amendment (CQ Press, 2008) and the author of First Amend-
ment: Freedom of Speech (Thomson Reuters, 2012). 
       ** M.T.S., Vanderbilt University; J.D. candidate, Nashville School of Law (2016). 
1.See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963). 
 2. See generally Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398. 
 3. 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990). 
 4. See id. at 880–81. 
 5. Id. at 881–882. 
 6. Note, The Best of a Bad Lot: Compromise and Hybrid Religious Exemptions, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 1494, 1495 (2010). . 
 7. Id. 
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Many legal commentators and courts believe the federal circuits have 
split on the issue of hybrid rights.8 However, an examination of case law 
reveals that, regardless of the various approaches, the lower courts’ analyses 
of hybrid rights claims sometimes differ in form, but rarely differ in sub-
stance. So, while many courts and legal commentators recognize at least 
three approaches to hybrid rights, this article contends there can only be one 
viable approach—rejection. This is so because, as Justice David Souter once 
opined, the hybrid rights exception is “untenable.”9 This article contends 
that religious liberty advocates should abandon the hybrid rights exception 
and seek protection elsewhere. 
Two paths have emerged to provide greater protection for religious lib-
erty. The first involves recasting free exercise claims as free speech claims. 
The second involves state and federal statutes that legislatively restore a 
strict scrutiny, pre-Smith approach. This article will argue that, of the two 
paths, free speech proves more promising. 
Part II of this article discusses Employment Division v. Smith, and in-
troduces the hybrid rights exception. It also reviews the backlash that fol-
lowed the Smith decision and outlines the ways state and federal govern-
ments attempted to override it. Part III focuses on the failure of the hybrid 
rights exception. It summarizes the lower courts’ responses and approaches 
to hybrid rights. Then, it illustrates each approach by analyzing specific hy-
brid rights cases. These cases support the contention that courts accepting a 
hybrid rights theory, in substance, look no different from courts that do not. 
Finally, Part IV discusses four main advantages to seeking refuge under the 
Free Speech Clause. 
II. EMPLOYMENT DIVISION V. SMITH: THE HYBRID RIGHTS EXCEPTION 
Understanding the hybrid rights exception requires an analysis of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith. It also requires 
examining how the religious liberty community responded in full force to 
the Smith decision. Part II.A will discuss the Smith decision and the hybrids 
rights exception. Part II.B will discuss the backlash to the hybrid rights ex-
ception. 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993) 
(Souter, J., concurring). 
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A. The Hybrid Rights Exception 
Justice Scalia created the hybrid rights exception in Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith.10 Alfred Smith and Galen Black worked as counselors for an 
Oregon-based private drug and alcohol rehabilitation center. When they 
ingested peyote as a part of a sacramental rite in the Native American 
Church., the rehabilitation organization fired them for “misconduct.”11 Be-
cause peyote use is illegal, the state’s employment division found Mr. Smith 
and Mr. Black ineligible for unemployment benefits.12 
The two men sued, arguing that the denial of benefits violated their 
free-exercise rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States.13 The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Free 
Exercise Clause would not protect them, because individuals have an obliga-
tion to comply with neutral laws of general applicability regardless of the 
burden those laws place on their religious practices.14 Thus, the Court ruled 
that Oregon did not have to grant a religious exemption in order to comply 
with the federal constitution.15 
In reaching its decision, the Court had to contend with a line of prece-
dent that granted exemptions when neutral, generally applicable laws inter-
fered with religious practice.16 For example, in three cases—Cantwell v. 
Connecticut,17 Murdock v. Pennsylvania,18 and Follett v. McCormick19—
Jehovah’s Witnesses faced sanctions for violating solicitation ordinances 
when they distributed religious materials door-to-door in residential neigh-
borhoods. In each case, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment protected their activities.20 
The Smith Court also distinguished Pierce v. Society of Sisters, a case 
involving an Oregon law prohibiting parents from sending their children to 
private schools.21 In Pierce, a private religious school sued state officials, 
arguing that a law requiring that all children attend public school violated 
parental rights under the Due Process Clause.22 The Court held that the law 
 
 10. 494 U.S. 872, 881(1990). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 876–77. 
 14. Id. at 879. 
 15. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 
 16. Id. at 881. 
 17. Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 301–02 (1940). 
 18. Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 114–15 (1943). 
 19. Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 574 (1944). 
 20. Id. at 578; Murdock, 319 U.S. at 114–15; Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303. In Murdock, the 
Court also found a violation of free speech. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 114–15. 
 21. 268 U.S. 510, 532 (1925). 
 22. Id. 
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in question infringed on the right of parents to direct the religious upbring-
ing and education of their children.23 
Justice Scalia also had to contend with the formidable precedent of 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, a decision in which the Court ruled that Amish parents 
were entitled to a religious based exemption from a mandatory compulsory 
education law.24 The parents sought an exemption because their religious 
faith required them to withdraw their children from school in the eighth 
grade.25 The Court decided Yoder on the same grounds as Pierce, holding 
that the state needed to exempt Amish families from the law.26 
The Smith Court noted that two other Jehovah’s Witness cases—West 
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette and Wooley v. Maynard—also in-
volved free-exercise rights, though the Court decided them on free-speech 
grounds.27 In Barnette, the Court reasoned that school officials could not 
suspend the children of Jehovah’s Witnesses when they refused to salute the 
American flag.28 The Barnettes taught their daughters saluting the flag was 
tantamount to worshipping a graven image, a practice forbidden by the Bi-
ble.29 In Wooley, the Court held that the State of New Hampshire violated 
the Constitution by imposing criminal sanctions on Jehovah’s Witnesses 
when they covered the motto “Live Free or Die” on their license plates.30 
The plaintiffs in Wooley contended that the motto contradicted their reli-
gious beliefs.31 The Court held in both cases that the First Amendment pro-
hibited the government from compelling speech.32 
The Court distinguished these cases by explaining that, unlike Smith, 
these cases involved “hybrid rights,” the Free Exercise Clause working in 
conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech, 
freedom of the press, or parental rights.33 Mr. Smith and Mr. Black’s case, 
 
 23. Id. at 534–35. The Court stated, “[W]e think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children . . . .” Id. 
 24. 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972). 
 25. Id. at 207–08. 
 26. Id. at 234. The Court states, “[T]he Court’s holding in Pierce stands as a charter of 
the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children.” Id. at 233. 
 27. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990). 
 28. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 29. Id. at 629. 
 30. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977). 
 31. Id. at 706–707. 
 32. Id. at 714; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
 33. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. Justice O’Connor stated in her concurring opinion, “The 
Court endeavors to escape from our decisions in Cantwell and Yoder by labeling them ‘hy-
brid’ decisions . . . but there is no denying that both cases expressly relied on the Free Exer-
cise Clause . . . and that we have consistently regarded those cases as part of the mainstream 
of our free exercise jurisprudence.” Id. at 896. So, one could argue the Court’s legal reason-
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the Court argued, did not “present such a hybrid situation,” because their 
free exercise claim did not connect with any “communicative activity or 
parental right.”34 The Court broadened its definition of “hybrid rights” by 
suggesting that free exercise could also combine with other rights, such as 
freedom of association.35 Thus, the Court distinguished a significant line of 
religious liberty cases and simultaneously created an exception to its new 
rule, known as the “hybrid rights” exception.36 Critics charged that Scalia’s 
“use of precedent borders on fiction.”37 
B. The Hybrid Rights Exception Backlash: Statutory Exemptions and Pro-
tection Under State Constitutions 
The Smith decision was controversial and the backlash was severe.38 
Professor Garrett Epps explained that the case “sparked a nationwide outcry 
by religious groups across the political and theological spectrum, and 
spurred Congress to seek to overrule the decision not once but twice.”39 
Congress responded by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA) in 1993.40 Contrary to the Smith rule, RFRA required the govern-
ment to justify any law substantially burdening religious practice with a 
compelling interest.41 A few years following RFRA’s enactment, however, 
 
ing in this instance amounts to what at least one judge refers to as a “bit of interpretive jig-
gery-pokery.” See King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2501 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 34. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. 
 35. Id. 
 36. The Court also had to contend with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In that 
case, the Court granted an exemption to an employee who likewise could not get unemploy-
ment benefits. Id. at 401–02. Her employer fired her because she would not work on the 
Sabbath. Id. at 399. Under the Sherbert test, the government may not burden religious prac-
tice without a compelling interest. Id. at 403. The majority stated in Smith that Sherbert (un-
like Smith) involved an unemployment benefits regime with a system of individual exemp-
tions. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. Under those specific circumstances, the government could not 
refuse to grant a religious exemption (in addition to others) without a compelling reason. Id. 
Thus, the Smith Court distinguished Sherbert, thereby creating a second exception to the 
Smith rule—the “Sherbert” exception. See Carol M. Kaplan, The Devil is in the Details: 
Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 
1046 (2000). 
 37. William P. Marshall, Correspondence: Correspondence on Free Exercise Revision-
ism; In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 309 (1991). 
 38. Ryan S. Rummage, Book Note, In Combination: Using Hybrid Rights to Expand 
Religious Liberty, 64 EMORY L.J. 1175, 1187 (2015). 
 39. GARRETT EPPS, THE STORY OF AL SMITH: THE FIRST AMENDMENT MEETS 
GRANDFATHER PEYOTE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 477, 477–78 (ed. Michael C. Dorf, 
New York, Thomson Reuters/Foundation Press, 2009). 
 40. Christopher Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAS, 55 
S.D. L. REV. 466, 471 (2010). 
 41. Id. at 471–72. 
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the Supreme Court struck it down as applied to the states.42 In response, 
Congress enacted a narrower law known as the Religious Land Use and In-
stitutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).43 Under RLUIPA, Congress reinstat-
ed the compelling interest test when a law substantially burdened religious 
practice, but only in the context of land use regulation and prisons.44 
After Smith, ten state high courts examined free exercise claims under 
their state constitutions and, contrary to the Smith Court, chose to apply a 
heightened level of review.45 Additionally, Alabama amended its constitu-
tion to restore the compelling interest test in free exercise cases.46 
At the same time, states also began enacting their own RFRAs.47 So far, 
twenty-one states have enacted some version of the original RFRA passed 
by Congress.48 In doing so, lawmakers hoped state RFRAs would provide 
greater protection to religious litigants than the federal constitution.49 How-
ever, many courts interpret state RFRAs in a manner unfavorable to reli-
gious claimants.50 For example, under many state RFRAs, in order to obtain 
strict scrutiny review, a litigant must show that the law in question places a 
substantial burden on his or her free exercise right.51 This “substantial bur-
den” test has become a difficult hurdle to clear.52 Consequently, RFRAs 
have morphed into “the dog that has not barked.”53 Because RFRAs can be 
weak protectors of religious liberty, some look to the hybrid rights exception 
 
 42. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533–34 (1997); Lund, supra note 40, at 471–
72. 
 43. Rummage, supra note 38, at 1188–89. 
 44. Id. at 1189. It is worth noting that litigants who have filed suit under RLUIPA have 
been met with inconsistent results. In the prison context, courts disagree on the level of defer-
ence given to prison officials. Case Comment, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act—Religious Liberty—Holt v. Hobbs, 129 HARV. L. REV. 351, 358–59 (2015). In 
the land use context, courts have split on the definition of “substantial burden.” Karla L. 
Chafee & Dwight H. Merriam, Six Fact Patterns of Substantial Burden in RLUIPA: Lessons 
for Potential Litigants, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 437, 439 (2009). 
 45. Paul Benjamin Linton, Religious Freedom and Defenses under State Constitutions, 7 
U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 186 (2013) (listing Alaska, Indiana, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Washington, and Wisconsin). 
 46. Id. at 108. 
 47. Lund, supra note 40, at 474. 
 48. See 2015 State Religious Freedom Restoration Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2015-state-
rfra-legislation.aspx (last visited August 7, 2016) (providing a list of the twenty-one states 
that have passed RFRAs as of September 3, 2015). 
 49. Lund, supra note 40, at 475–76. 
 50. Id. at 485. 
 51. Id. at 477. 
 52. Id. at 488; see also Mark Strasser, Old Wine, Old Bottles, and Not Very New Corks: 
On State RFRAS and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 335, 359–60 
(2015). 
 53. Lund, supra note 40, at 469. 
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for protection.54 But, in a vast majority of cases, the hybrid rights exception 
has not delivered on its promise.55 
III. THE FAILURE OF AND THE RESPONSE TO THE HYBRID RIGHTS 
EXCEPTION 
The hybrid rights exception produced unanswered questions that lower 
courts struggled to answer. As such, courts applied the hybrid rights excep-
tion differently. Part III.A discusses the failure of the hybrid rights excep-
tion, and Part III.B discusses the four approaches courts generally use when 
applying the hybrid rights exception. 
A. The Failure of the Hybrid Rights Exception 
In Smith, the Supreme Court left many unanswered questions concern-
ing its hybrid rights exception: 
(1) What types of companion claims can combine with a free exer-
cise claim to form a hybrid? 
(2) How strong must the companion claim be? 
(3) If the court finds a hybrid right, should it apply strict scruti-
ny?
56
 
Lower courts need broad, clearly articulated rules in order to create 
“equality, efficiency, and predictability.”57 At the same time, litigants need 
to know what to expect when they bring their claims.58 Lower courts and 
litigants need answers. The Smith Court left them wanting. 
Some legal commentators argue that the Smith Court never meant for 
the hybrid rights exception to be a substantive one—that it “was not intend-
 
 54. See Rummage, supra note 38, at 1188–89. 
 55. A thorough review of the case law on hybrid rights reveals only one successful hy-
brid rights claim at the appellate court level—a Supreme Court of Pennsylvania case. Shepp 
v. Shepp, 906 A.2d 1165 (Pa. 2006). In that case, a trial court forbade a father from speaking 
to his daughter about his religious beliefs concerning polygamy. Id. at 1168. The court found 
a free exercise/parental rights hybrid sufficiently similar to Yoder to warrant strict scrutiny. 
Id. at 1173. 
 56. See, e.g., Benjamin I. Siminou, Making Sense of Hybrid Rights: An Analysis of the 
Nebraska Supreme Court’s Approach to the Hybrid-Rights Exception in Douglas County v. 
Anaya, 85 NEB. L. REV. 311, 317–18 (2006). 
 57. The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6, at 1511. 
 58. Id. 
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ed to be taken seriously.”59 But, as one federal district court judge lamented, 
“[T]he language of Smith remains,” and a lower court must “give meaning 
to the seemingly impenetrable hybrid-rights exception by applying the law 
to the facts of cases before it.”60 
Consequently, some courts have attempted to piece together a broad 
principle that can be applied consistently in different cases.61 However, 
“there is no feasible broad-rule approach to hybrid rights.”62 The most sig-
nificant problem occurs when courts grapple with the strength of the com-
panion claim.63 To this, Justice Souter reasoned, if the exception requires the 
companion claim to be implicated, then the exception would “swallow the 
Smith rule,” because the peyote-smoking ritual at issue in Smith implicated 
two companion rights—freedom of speech and freedom of association.64 On 
the other hand, if the hybrid rights exception requires the litigant to show a 
violation of the companion right, then the free exercise claim becomes su-
perfluous.65 
B. The Response to the Hybrid Rights Exception: Four Approaches to 
Hybrid Rights 
Most legal commentators have identified three main approaches to hy-
brid rights: (1) rejection; (2) independent viability; and (3) colorable claim.66 
One might also argue a fourth approach—”cabining.”67 As the federal circuit 
 
 59. Bradley C. Johnson, Note, By Its Fruits Ye Know: Axson-Flynn v. Johnson: More 
Rotted Fruit from Employment Division v. Smith, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1287, 1310 (2005). 
Professor Michael McConnell believes the majority in Smith used hybrid rights “to reach the 
conclusion it desired . . . without openly overruling any prior decisions.” The Best of a Bad 
Lot, supra note 6, at 1497–98. 
 60. Hicks v. Halifax Bd. of Educ., 93 F.Supp.2d 649, 660–61 (E.D.N.C. 1999). 
 61. The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6, at 1511. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Church of the Lukumi Babulu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring). So far, only the Third Circuit has addressed a free exer-
cise/freedom of association hybrid. In that case, the Salvation Army sought an exemption 
from a state statute regulating boarding houses. Salvation Army v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 
919 F.2d 183, 185 (3d. Cir. 1990). The court noted that the right to freedom of association 
derived from the First Amendment and attached to either the expression of ideas (free speech) 
or the exercise of religion (free exercise). Id. at 199. The right to free speech, the court ex-
plained, had “different contours than the right to free exercise of religion.” Id. The court then 
reasoned, “[w]e would not expect a derivative right to receive greater protection than the 
right from which it was derived.” Id. 
 64. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 567 
 65. Id. 
 66. The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6, at 1495. 
 67. Id. No court has used the “cabining” approach by name. At least one other commen-
tator suggests a “genuine implication” approach. See Siminou, supra note 56, at 318. Under 
this approach, the hybrid must consist of one of three companion claims—free speech, paren-
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courts of appeal split on the meaning and application of the hybrid rights 
exception, some courts have implored the Supreme Court for clarification.68 
But, the cases consistently reveal that, when a litigant brings a hybrid rights 
claim before any court (regardless of the named approach), and the law in 
question is neutral and generally applicable, the court will apply the same 
basic analysis. Thus, one wonders if lower courts truly need the clarification 
they seek. 
For parental rights/free exercise hybrids, for example, the level of scru-
tiny depends entirely on its similarity to Yoder. If the case closely resembles 
Yoder, the court will apply a heightened level of review. If not, the court 
will apply Smith’s general rule to the free exercise claim. The foregoing 
cases suggest this is true of courts that accept and courts that reject hybrid 
rights. 
For any other free exercise hybrid, most courts analyze the companion 
right separately, applying relevant jurisprudence and tests. The level of scru-
tiny hinges entirely on the level of scrutiny required by the companion 
claim. If the court finds a violation of the companion right, it usually 
grounds its holding there.69 If not, the court applies Smith’s general rule to 
the free exercise claim. Again, the case law suggests this is true of courts 
that accept a hybrid rights theory and of those that do not. The following 
subsections discuss the four possible approaches to hybrid rights and the 
circuits that apply such approaches, beginning with the rejection approach. 
 
tal rights, or freedom of association. Id. at 324. In addition, the challenged law must “genu-
inely implicate” the asserted companion right. Id. Siminou argues that some district courts 
use this approach, focusing on the court’s hybrid rights analysis in Hicks v. The Halifax Bd. 
of Educ. Id. at 325. This article contends the Hicks court’s analysis fits a “cabining” ap-
proach, as discussed later. Like the “cabining” approach, no court has used the “genuine 
implication” approach by name. Id. at 326. 
 68. For example, the Ninth Circuit stated in an en banc decision, “Smith itself is fraught 
with complexity both in doctrine and in practice . . . [p]erhaps the Supreme Court will have 
an opportunity before this issue arises again in this circuit to refine its approach in this area . . 
. .” Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1147–48 (9th Cir. 2000). 
The Sixth Circuit stated, “therefore, at least until the Supreme Court holds that legal stand-
ards under the Free Exercise Clause vary depending on whether other constitutional rights are 
implicated, we will not use a stricter legal standard than that used in Smith . . . .” Kissinger v. 
Bd. of Trs., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 69. And, even if it does not ground its holding in the companion claim, it certainly 
could. The free exercise analysis is often superfluous. 
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1. The Rejection Approach: Some Courts Reject the Hybrid Rights 
Exception     
One approach to the hybrid rights exception is to reject it completely. 
The Sixth, Second, and Third Circuits have adopted this approach.70 These 
circuits apply Smith’s general rule to the free exercise claim, regardless of 
any other rights asserted. However, should the facts of the case closely re-
semble Yoder, these courts have indicated they would apply a heightened 
level of review. The following subsections discuss key decisions rejecting 
the hybrid rights exception in each circuit. 
a. The Sixth Circuit: Kissinger v. Board of Trustees of Ohio 
State University 
While a student at the College of Veterinary Medicine at Ohio State 
University, Jennifer Kissinger wanted to opt out of a required course in vet-
erinary surgery, because healthy animals would be killed as part of the 
class.71 Ms. Kissinger claimed this activity would violate her religious be-
liefs.72 When the university informed her she would need the course to grad-
uate, Ms. Kissinger sued, claiming a violation of freedom of religion, free-
dom of speech, freedom of association, equal protection, and due process.73 
She contended the hybrid rights exception applied to her claim.74 
The Sixth Circuit characterized the hybrid rights exception as “illogi-
cal,” explaining it made no sense that a state regulation would violate the 
Free Exercise Clause only if it implicated other constitutional rights.75 The 
court applied Smith’s general rule to Kissinger’s claim, finding the school’s 
curriculum was generally applicable and neutral, with no system of particu-
larized exemptions.76 Therefore, the school did not violate Ms. Kissinger’s 
free exercise right when it refused to grant her an exemption.77 The court 
also distinguished Ms. Kissinger’s claim from Yoder (though her claim did 
not involve parental rights) noting that, unlike the Amish families in Yoder, 
 
 70. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has yet to address the 
hybrid rights exception, but a district court in the Eleventh Circuit rejected it. See Warner v. 
City of Boca Raton, 64 F.Supp.2d 1272, 1288, n.12 (S.D. Fla. 1999). 
 71. Kissinger v. Bd. of Tr. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 178 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 179. The parties reached a settlement, but the district court refused to award 
Ms. Kissinger any attorney’s fees. Id. at 178. Thus, Ms. Kissinger appealed. Id. 
 74. Id. at 180. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 179. 
 77. Kissinger, 5 F.3d. at 178. The court would not award Ms. Kissinger any attorney’s 
fees. Id. 
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the government did not compel Ms. Kissinger to attend veterinary school.78 
She willingly enrolled knowing the school would require her to take the 
surgery course.79 
b. The Second Circuit: Leebaert v. Harrington 
In Leebaert v. Harrington, the Second Circuit also declined to recog-
nize the hybrid rights exception.80 Mr. Leebaert argued that the government 
infringed on his constitutional right to direct the upbringing and education of 
his son, Corky, by requiring that Corky attend a health education class.81 He 
claimed the program ran counter to his religious beliefs about sex.82 
Mr. Leebaert contended that the government’s action in this case war-
ranted strict scrutiny because his claim (1) consisted of a parental rights/free 
exercise hybrid; and (2) closely resembled Yoder.83 Though the court de-
clined to recognize the hybrid rights exception, it applied Yoder to Leeba-
ert’s claim, acknowledging that Yoder required a heightened level of re-
view.84 However, unlike the Amish parents in Yoder, the government in 
Leebaert’s case did not threaten his “entire way of life” by requiring 
Corky’s participation in a health education class.85 Thus, Leebaert’s claim 
did not receive heightened scrutiny.86 
c. The Third Circuit: McTernan v. City of York 
Mr. McTernan stood in an alleyway at the back entrance of a Planned 
Parenthood, distributing pro-life literature and talking to potential patrons 
and staff.87 A police officer restricted access to the back entrance and threat-
ened to arrest Mr. McTernan if he saw him lingering there.88 Mr. McTernan 
sued, claiming the officer violated his First Amendment freedoms of speech, 
 
 78. Id. at 180–81. 
 79. Id. 
 80. 332 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 81. Id. at 137. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 139. Leebaert also argued a parent’s right to direct the education of his child is 
“fundamental” under Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). Id. But, the court held this 
parental right does not include the right to exempt one’s child from public school require-
ments. Id. at 141. 
 84. Id. at 144. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 144. 
 87. McTernan v. City of York, Pa., 564 F.3d 636, 641 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 88. Id. at 643. 
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association, and religion.89 Mr. McTernan argued that the court should apply 
strict scrutiny to his free exercise claim because it fit the hybrid rights ex-
ception.90 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also rejected 
the hybrid rights exception.91 Instead, it applied Smith’s general rule to the 
free exercise claim, and determined that, though the restriction was neutral, 
a jury would need to decide if the officer applied the restriction in a general 
manner.92 If so, the Free Exercise Clause would not protect Mr. McTernan’s 
activities.93 
As to Mr. McTernan’s free speech claim, the court held that the of-
ficer’s action was content neutral, which meant that the court would uphold 
the restriction if it served a significant government interest and was narrow-
ly tailored to serve that interest (intermediate scrutiny).94 Hence, if a jury 
determined that the restriction was neutral and generally applicable under 
the Free Exercise Clause, it would apply the level of review dictated by the 
free speech claim. 
2. The Independent Viability Approach: Some Courts Permit a Hy-
brid Rights Exception, as Long as a Litigant Proves a Violation 
Another approach to the hybrid rights exception is to focus attention on 
the other constitutional claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) and the Supreme Court of New 
Mexico have adopted this method—called the independent viability ap-
proach.95 Under this approach, the free exercise claim could conceivably 
connect with any constitutional right to form a hybrid.96 At the same time, 
these courts require the plaintiff to prove that the government has violated 
the companion right.97 The free exercise claim warrants strict scrutiny only 
if the companion claim does.98 So, while these courts recognize a hybrid 
 
 89. Id. at 644. The court noted that, though McTernan referenced freedom of associa-
tion, he did not argue it in his brief. Id. at 644, n.3. The court subsumed this claim into its free 
speech analysis. Id. 
 90. Id. at 647, n.5. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 649. 
 93. McTernan, 564 F.3d at 649. 
 94. Id. at 652–53. 
 95. The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6, at 1500–01. This case comment discusses the 
D.C. Circuit’s approach, but does not discuss the Supreme Court of New Mexico’s approach. 
 96. For example, the D.C. Circuit found a Free Exercise/Establishment Clause hybrid in 
E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 97. Rummage, supra note 36, at 1193. 
 98. Id. at 1194. 
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rights theory, they approach their cases no differently than the courts that 
reject it.99 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico recently decided a case illustrating 
the independent viability approach as applied to a free exercise/free speech 
hybrid.100 The D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, applied the approach to a 
Free Exercise/Establishment Clause hybrid.101 In both cases, however, the 
hybrid rights analysis did little to distinguish either court from the Sixth, 
Second, or Third Circuits. The following sections discuss the key decisions 
in the circuits adopting the independent viability approach. 
a. The Supreme Court of New Mexico: Elane Photography v. 
Willock 
The New Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA) prohibits businesses 
providing public accommodations from discriminating against people based 
on sexual orientation.102 Elane Photography refused to photograph a com-
mitment ceremony between two women.103 It claimed the act, as applied, 
violated its First Amendment free speech and free exercise rights.104 Further, 
because Elane Photography raised both a free exercise and a compelled 
speech claim, it argued hybrid rights.105 
First, Elane Photography contended the NMHRA impermissibly com-
pelled it to engage in expression that sent a positive message about same-sex 
marriage.106 The Supreme Court of New Mexico reasoned that the NMHRA 
did not require Elane Photography to recite or display any message.107 It did 
not regulate the content of the photographs.108 Nor did it even require Elane 
Photography to take photographs.109 The NMHRA merely stated that, if a 
business chooses to operate as a public accommodation, it cannot discrimi-
nate against people based on sexual orientation.110 
Elane Photography also argued that, by compelling it to photograph 
same-sex weddings, observers would view it as approving same-sex mar-
riage.111 The court disagreed, asserting that most observers do not assume a 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013). 
 101. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455. 
 102. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 58. 
 103. Id. at 59. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 75. 
 106. Id. at 63. 
 107. Id. at 64. 
 108. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 64. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 68. 
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wedding photographer shares the couple’s views on marriage, or any other 
subject for that matter.112 
Thus, the court did not find the free speech claim to be “independently 
viable.”113 And, because the NMHRA was a neutral law of general applica-
bility, the government did not violate Elane Photography’s free exercise 
rights.114 “Elane Photography,” the court stated, “offers no analysis to ex-
plain why the two claims together should be greater than the sum of their 
parts.”115 So, like the Third Circuit’s free exercise/free speech case, if the 
law is neutral and generally applicable, the court will apply a heightened 
level of review only if the free speech claim warrants it. 
b. The D.C. Circuit: E.E.O.C. v. Catholic University of America 
Sister Elizabeth McDonough and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission sued Catholic University of America for engaging in sex dis-
crimination, in violation of Title VII, when it denied her application for ten-
ure in its Department of Canon Law.116 The E.E.O.C. argued that, because 
Title VII was a neutral law of generally applicability, Catholic University 
would have to comply.117 
The court dismissed the E.E.O.C.’s claim for two primary reasons: (1) 
Sister McDonough served as the functional equivalent of minister, which the 
Free Exercise Clause forbids judicial review because of the ministerial ex-
ception;118 and (2) an intrusive investigation by the government into the ten-
ure process for a theological appointment promoted excessive entanglement 
between government and religion in violation of the Establishment 
Clause.119 The court then held, in the alternative, that the case presented a 
Free Exercise/Establishment Clause “hybrid situation,” which would permit 
 
 112. Id. at 69. 
 113. Id. at 75. 
 114. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 75. 
 115. Id. at 75–76. The court also complained that Elane Photography did not properly 
brief the hybrid rights claim. Id. at 75. One legal commentator argues that the Supreme 
Court’s failure to adequately address the hybrid rights exception creates a “trifurcated prob-
lem” for litigants: (1) Litigants fail to fully brief their claims; (2) some courts will not address 
or adjudicate hybrid claims without further guidance from the Supreme Court; and (3) quali-
fied immunity often prevents litigants from obtaining damages in free exercise cases. Rum-
mage, supra note 38, at 1197. 
 116. E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 457 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 117. Id. at 461–62. 
 118. The ministerial exception to the Free Exercise Clause exempts the selection and 
employment of clergy from Title VII and similar statutes. Id. Therefore, under the ministerial 
exception, courts will not decide employment discrimination suits by ministers against the 
religious institutions that employ them. Id. 
 119. Id. at 457. 
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the court to find a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, even if the court 
was wrong about the ministerial exception.120 
Many legal commentators believe the D.C. Circuit took an independent 
viability approach because it required a violation of the companion claim 
(the Establishment Clause), before finding a free exercise hybrid121 (though 
one could argue the court took no position because it applied the hybrid 
rights exception in an alternative holding).122 Even without the Free Exercise 
Clause, however, the court found in favor of Catholic University, because 
the E.E.O.C. failed the Lemon test.123 Thus, the hybrid rights analysis did 
little to distinguish the D.C. Circuit from the other analyses.124 
3. The Colorable Claim Approach: Some Courts Permit a Hybrid 
Rights Exception Without Requiring a Litigant to Prove a Viola-
tion 
In an attempt to avoid this problem, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have 
developed the colorable claim approach.125 Like the independent viability 
approach, under this approach, any constitutional right can combine with the 
free exercise claim to form a hybrid.126 However, unlike the independent 
viability approach, the litigant does not have to prove the violation.127 A 
colorable claim determination is similar to a “likelihood of success on the 
merits” analysis for preliminary injunctions.128 The requisite strength of the 
 
 120. Id. at 467. 
 121. The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6, at 1501. 
 122. Id. Subsequent cases reveal the D.C. Circuit has adopted an independent viability 
approach. See Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The combination of 
two untenable claims equals a tenable one.”); Mahoney v. District of Columbia, 662 
F.Supp.2d 74, 95, n.12 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Plaintiffs may not, however, raise a ‘hybrid claim,’ 
because they do not have an independently viable claim under the Speech Clause.”). 
 123. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 470; see also The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6, 
at 1501. 
 124. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 467; see also The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6, 
at 1502. 
 125. Rummage, supra note 38, at 1195. At least one case suggests the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is open to the colorable claim approach. Cornerstone 
Christian Sch. v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 563 F.3d 127, 136, n.8 (5th Cir. 2009). In 
Cornerstone, the plaintiffs did not ask the court to apply the hybrid rights exception, but did 
allege a violation of their free exercise and parental rights under Yoder. Id. After discussing 
the claim’s dissimilarity to Yoder, the court explained it would not apply the hybrid rights 
exception, because the Plaintiffs did not present a “colorable claim” for a violation of either 
their free exercise or their due process rights. Id. 
 126. Rummage, supra note 38, at 1210. 
 127. See id. at 1195. 
 128. See id. at 1198–99; see also Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 
692, 706 (9th Cir. 1999), reh’g granted, opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999), 
and on reh’g, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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companion claim ostensibly falls somewhere between the two extremes—it 
requires more than mere implication, but less than independent viability.129 
Thus, if a litigant establishes a fair probability of success for the com-
panion claim, and the plaintiff can couple that claim with a free exercise 
right, the court will apply strict scrutiny.130 However, a litigant without a 
free exercise claim would need to prove a violation.131 Because this kind of 
analysis favors religious claimants, it raises Equal Protection and Establish-
ment Clause concerns.132 
In practice, however, the colorable claim approach looks no different 
than the independent viability approach.133 Though a colorable claim court 
says it is determining a companion claim’s “likelihood of success on the 
merits,” it actually analyzes the claim much like courts that require inde-
pendent viability.134 As one critic observed, “it is difficult for a court to ana-
lyze a constitutional claim only halfway,” especially when it has all of the 
essential facts.135 So, the colorable claim approach runs into the same prob-
lems as the independent viability approach in that the exception becomes 
superfluous to the analysis.136 This analytical flaw appears most clearly in a 
recent Tenth Circuit case.137 
a. The Tenth Circuit: Axson-Flynn v. Johnson 
Christina Axson-Flynn enrolled in the University of Utah’s Actor 
Training Program (“ATP”).138 Because Axson-Flynn is Mormon she refused 
to say “fuck” or “God damn” during classroom exercises.139 Axson-Flynn 
wanted to substitute other words for the offensive ones, but a faculty mem-
ber told her to “get over” it.140 The faculty never ordered Axson-Flynn to 
leave the program, but she assumed they would eventually force her out.141 
Thus, Axson-Flynn filed a lawsuit, claiming the school violated her free 
 
 129. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 705. 
 130. See The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6, at 1506. 
 131. See id. 
 132. Id. at 1511. 
 133. Johnson, supra note 59, at 1312. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See id. at 1312–13. 
 138. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 139. Id. 
 140. See id. 
 141. Id. 
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speech and free exercise rights.142 She contended her claim fit the hybrid 
rights exception.143 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit first exam-
ined her free speech claim.144 Because the speech in question was school-
sponsored speech, the court applied the Hazelwood test.145 Under Hazel-
wood, the school’s restriction on speech or press only had to be “reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”—a form of rational basis re-
view.146 The school justified its restriction as a methodology for preparing 
students for careers in acting.147 
The court found that, though this methodology was not necessary to the 
program’s pedagogical goal, it was reasonably related to it.148 However, 
Axson-Flynn countered that the proffered goal served as a pretext for an 
ulterior motive—religious discrimination.149 The court decided to remand 
the free speech claim for further fact finding, because it could not determine, 
from the facts before it, if the claim had “a fair probability or likelihood, but 
not certitude, of success on the merits.”150 
Thus, even with a lower threshold requirement for the companion 
claim, the court required the government to fail rational basis review before 
it would apply strict scrutiny to the free exercise claim. So, the Tenth Circuit 
falls into the same trap as a court applying the independent viability ap-
proach, and the hybrid rights exception becomes pointless to the analysis. 
This analytical flaw is apparent even when the free exercise hybrid consists 
of companion rights other than free speech, as evidenced by a Ninth Circuit 
case, Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission. 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 1294–95. 
 144. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1283. 
 145. Id. at 1285. 
 146. Id. at 1289. 
 147. Id. at 1291. 
 148. Id. at 1292. 
 149. Id. at 1293. 
 150. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1297. The court ultimately decided it would not remand 
the case on the hybrid rights issue, because the defendants were entitled to qualified immuni-
ty. Id. at 1297. When determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, 
courts engage in a two-step inquiry: (1) did the defendant violate the plaintiff’s constitutional 
rights; and (2) was the law clearly defined at the time of the violation? John C. Williams, 
Qualifying Qualified Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1298 (2012). In Axson-Flynn, the 
court held the hybrid rights exception was not clearly defined at the time of the defendants’ 
actions. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1301. A more recent Supreme Court case further exacer-
bates the problem that qualified immunity creates for hybrid rights litigants. In Pearson v. 
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), the Supreme Court of the United States held that courts could 
answer the clarity question without reaching the constitutional issue. Williams, Qualifying 
Qualified Immunity, at 1299. Thus, the doctrine of qualified immunity may preclude further 
development of the hybrid rights exception, since courts no longer have to determine if the 
government violated a constitutional right. Id. 
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b. The Ninth Circuit: Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights 
Commission 
Kevin Thomas and Joyce Baker owned residential rental properties in 
Anchorage, Alaska.151 Both the state and city passed laws forbidding dis-
crimination in rental housing based on marital status. Thomas and Baker, 
avowed Christians, believed it was a sin for unmarried couples to cohabitate, 
and refused to rent to them.152 They sued the Anchorage Equal Rights 
Commission (“AERA”), claiming a violation of their free exercise rights.153 
The AERA argued that, because the law was neutral and generally applica-
ble, the plaintiffs would have to comply with the law, regardless of the bur-
den it placed on their free exercise right.154 To the contrary, Thomas and 
Baker insisted the hybrid rights exception applied, because the law also vio-
lated their Fifth Amendment eminent domain and First Amendment free-
speech rights.155 
The court first applied the requisite three-factor test to determine if the 
law, in effect, operated as a regulatory taking in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment.156 The court considered the economic impact of the regulation, 
the interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of 
the action.157 Citing Supreme Court precedent, the court concluded that, 
though the law had no economic impact on the plaintiffs, it sufficiently in-
terfered with their dominion and possession to qualify as a regulatory tak-
ing.158 Therefore, the court held that the Fifth Amendment claim was “color-
able.”159 
The court then addressed the free speech allegation.160 The plaintiffs 
pointed to provisions in the law that forbade them from making “a written or 
oral inquiry or record” of the marital status of a prospective renter, or to 
“‘represent to a person that real property is not available for inspection, sale, 
rental, or lease’ on the basis of the lessee’s marital status.”161 Applying rele-
vant free speech jurisprudence, the court determined that the speech in ques-
 
 151. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1999), 
reh’g granted, opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999), and on reh’g, 220 F.3d 
1134 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 152. Id. at 696–97. 
 153. Id. at 697. 
 154. Id. at 702. 
 155. Id. The court overturned this decision, en banc. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal 
Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 156. Thomas, 165 F.3d. 692, 708. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 709. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 702. 
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tion was not commercial speech subject to intermediate scrutiny, but pure 
religious speech, subject to strict scrutiny.162 
Because the court found both the Fifth Amendment and First Amend-
ment free speech claims colorable (and thus likely to succeed), it applied 
strict scrutiny to the free exercise claim (though it could have reached the 
same result by applying strict scrutiny to the free speech claim without ref-
erence to the free exercise claim).163 Applying strict scrutiny, the court de-
termined that Alaska’s interest in preventing marital status discrimination 
was not compelling, in large part because unmarried couples did not qualify 
as a “suspect class.”164 At the same time, the law placed a substantial burden 
on Thomas and Baker’s free exercise rights.165 Therefore, to comply with the 
Constitution, the AERA would need to grant Thomas and Baker an exemp-
tion from the law.166 
Despite trying to find a middle ground between implication and inde-
pendent viability, one could argue that the Ninth Circuit differs little from 
the other circuits. Though one might disagree with the court’s conclusions 
concerning the strength of the Fifth and First Amendment claims, it fully 
adjudicated each one, applying the requisite jurisprudence and tests.167 In 
addition, because the plaintiffs could have prevailed solely on the regulatory 
takings claim or the free speech claim, the plaintiffs did not need the hybrid 
rights exception. 
 
 162. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 710. 
 163. Id. at 714. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. The dissent argued that Thomas lacked standing on the Fifth Amendment claim, 
because the statute took effect well before he entered the residential rental market. Id. at 725. 
So, he knew the law would restrain his right to exclude. Id. In addition, the dissent argued the 
speech in question was commercial speech, subject to the Central-Hudson test. Id. at 726. It 
also took issue with the court’s analysis of hybrid rights, and advocated an approach “con-
sistent with principles of judicial restraint.” Id. at 723. It suggested that a court should only 
consider the hybrid rights exception when confronted with a case paralleling one of the cases 
distinguished by Smith. Id. As previously noted, the Ninth Circuit subsequently reviewed this 
case en banc and held the claim was not justiciable. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights 
Comm’n, 220 F.3d. 1134, 1137–38 (9th Cir. 2000). It also chose to take no position on the 
hybrid rights exception until the Supreme Court could clarify the issue. Id. at 1147–48. De-
spite this decision, courts in the Ninth Circuit continue to apply the colorable claim approach. 
See Am. Family Ass’n, Inc. v. City and Cty. of S. F., 277 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002); Every 
Nation Campus Ministries v. Achtenberg, 597 F.Supp.2d 1075 (S.D. Cal. 2009); Jacobs v. 
Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 373 F.Supp.2d 1162 (D. Nev. 2005); 
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4. The “Cabining” Approach: Some Courts Limit Hybrid Rights to 
Certain Claims 
To avoid these issues, some commentators propose a “cabining” ap-
proach.168 One might argue that, to some extent, the First Circuit follows this 
kind of approach.169 Whereas the independent viability and colorable claim 
approaches set forth broad rules, “cabining” forges a very narrow path.170 It 
restricts the hybrid rights doctrine to claims and fact patterns that quite 
closely resemble the cases distinguished in Smith, like Wisconsin v. Yoder.171 
Most of the courts who have applied this approach would find a free 
exercise/parental right hybrid only in cases with facts similar to Yoder.172 
More specifically, courts will apply strict scrutiny only when litigants prove 
that the government has substantially interfered with their ability to pass 
their religious beliefs and practices to their children.173 
In essence, this approach does not differ from an outright rejection. 
For, though the Second Circuit has refused to recognize the hybrid rights 
exception, it still applies Yoder when the facts of the case require it. The 
only difference between the First Circuit and the Second Circuit is that the 
First Circuit applies Yoder in the name of a free exercise/parental rights hy-
brid, and the Second Circuit applies Yoder without reference to hybrid 
rights, as shown by the following examples. 
 
 168. The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6, at 1495. 
 169. Id. at 1507. 
 170. Id. at 1495. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1513. While most cases implicate Yoder, the Fifth Circuit decided a hybrid 
rights case similar to Barnette and Wooley. In that case, potential juror, Robin Murray-
O’Hair, an atheist, refused to take the required pre-voir dire oath because it included a refer-
ence to God. Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 939 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1991). 
The judge jailed her for contempt. Id. She sued, alleging a violation of her free exercise right. 
Id. The court held that a God-free affirmation is a “religious statement.” Id. Citing Barnette 
and Wooley, the court explained that the Constitution protected the right to refrain from 
speaking when to do so would be morally objectionable. Id. at 1215. Though these principles 
are “bottomed on the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause,” they “developed in response 
to religiously-motivated objections to coerced speech.” Id. Because Smith reaffirmed “[that 
the] government may not compel affirmation of religious belief,” the Free Exercise Clause 
protected Murray-O’Hair. Id. at 1216. Though the court granted declaratory relief, it also held 
that Judge Herman was immune from suit. Id. at 1211. The Fifth Circuit overturned this 
decision en banc, holding Murray-O’Hair lacked standing. Id. at 1284. 
 173. The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6, at 1500–01. 
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a. First Circuit: Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions and 
Parker v. Hurley 
For a number of years, commentators put the First Circuit in the inde-
pendent viability camp, primarily due to the court’s analysis of hybrid rights 
in Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions.174 In Brown, the fifteen-year-
old plaintiffs attended a required program on AIDS awareness, where the 
leader of the program subjected them to “sexually explicit monologues” and 
“sexually suggestive skits.”175 The parents and children sued, asserting a 
parental rights/free exercise hybrid.176 After separately analyzing the paren-
tal rights contention, the court rejected the hybrid rights claim for two rea-
sons: first, the free exercise right did not conjoin with an “independently 
protected” constitutional right; and second, unlike Yoder, a one-time com-
pulsory attendance at an assembly did not “threaten their entire way of 
life.”177 Thereafter, commentators assumed the First Circuit would take an 
independent viability approach, because it required the companion right to 
be “independently protected.”178 
However, the First Circuit disputed that categorization in Parker v. 
Hurley, another parental rights/free exercise case.179 In Parker, two parents 
sued a Massachusetts school district, because teachers subjected their chil-
dren to books depicting same-sex couples in a positive manner.180 This of-
fended their religious beliefs about homosexuality.181 The First Circuit 
seemed to reserve the right to develop its approach to hybrid rights more 
fully.182 At the same time, it suggested a successful hybrid rights claim 
would have to resemble one of the cases distinguished in Smith, particularly 
Yoder.183 The court held that the burden on the parents’ free exercise rights 
in Parker did not rise to the level of that in Yoder.184 
 
 174. 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996). 
 175. Id. at 529. 
 176. Id. at 539. 
 177. Id. 
 178. The Best of a Bad Lot, supra note 6, at 1507. 
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note 6, at 1507. 
 180. Parker, 514 F.3d at 90. 
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b. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
North Carolina: Hicks v. The Halifax Board of Education 
Hicks v. The Halifax Board of Education, a case decided by a district 
court in the Eastern District of North Carolina, offers an example of a more 
developed “cabining” approach.185 In Hicks, elementary school officials sus-
pended Aaron Ganues because he would not comply with the school’s uni-
form policy.186 His great-grandmother (and legal guardian) believed that, by 
wearing the school uniform, Aaron would be showing an allegiance to the 
Antichrist, a being who required conformity.187 The school district filed a 
motion for summary judgment, arguing that under Smith, the plaintiffs had 
to comply with the uniform policy, because it was a neutral, generally appli-
cable rule.188 To the contrary, Ms. Hicks argued that her claim warranted 
strict scrutiny because it consisted of a parental rights/free exercise hy-
brid.189 The court agreed with Ms. Hicks.190 
The “‘hybrid’ path of parental religious freedom left narrowly open by 
[Smith],” the court contended, required that the “character of the interfer-
ence” closely resemble that in Yoder and Pierce.191 The court acknowledged 
that Ms. Hicks had the constitutional right to direct her child’s upbringing in 
a manner consistent with her religious beliefs.192 The court stated, “[a]t stake 
in this case is Hicks’ ability to impress upon her great-grandson the truth 
and importance of her religious beliefs, specifically those beliefs regarding 
 
 185. 93 F.Supp.2d 649 (N.D.N.C. 1999). The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit has not taken a clear approach to the hybrid rights exception, though it has 
acknowledged its validity. See Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 
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the preparation for salvation.”193 The court held Ms. Hick’s case closely 
resembled Yoder.194 As a result, the court applied strict scrutiny to the school 
district’s policy.195 
The analysis in Parker and Hicks is virtually identical to the Second 
Circuit’s analysis in Leebaert. All three courts applied Yoder to free exer-
cise/parental rights cases in lieu of Smith’s general rule. All three courts 
required the character of the free exercise/parental rights claim to parallel 
that in Yoder. The only difference is that one court (the Second Circuit) re-
jected hybrid rights and the other two did not. 
Obviously, the lower courts have struggled to apply the hybrid rights 
exception. That explains the various approaches the courts have adopted. 
Part IV explains another alternative in lieu of hybrid rights. 
IV. FREE EXERCISE AS FREE SPEECH: ADVANTAGES TO SEEKING REFUGE 
UNDER THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE IN LIEU OF A HYBRID RIGHTS EXCEPTION 
Religious claimants seem to assert the free exercise/free speech hybrid 
as often as they assert the free exercise/parental rights hybrid. However, one 
could argue that the Free Speech Clause alone may offer sufficient protec-
tion to religious litigants. Although the Free Speech Clause was not de-
signed intentionally to protect religious liberties, it has often done so.196 Be-
ginning in the 1940s, when the Supreme Court decided Cantwell, Murdock, 
and Barnette, for example, free speech and free exercise often worked hand-
in-hand.197 This likely is because the Court had not yet developed free exer-
cise jurisprudence.198 As a result, free exercise often “piggyback[ed] on the 
shoulders” of free speech.199 In those, free speech/free exercise cases in the 
1940s, the Court provided religious speech with the same protection as po-
litical speech.200 
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In the next forty years, however, free speech and free exercise devel-
oped independently of one another.201 Through its free speech jurisprudence, 
the Court created a complex doctrinal framework.202 As that framework de-
veloped, an important principle emerged—the principle of content neutrali-
ty.203 Under this principle, the Court subjected content-based laws, re-
strictions based on the content or subject matter of the speech, to strict scru-
tiny.204 
In a series of important free-speech decisions, the Rehnquist Court held 
that providing equal access to religious speech in a public forum did not 
violate the Establishment Clause, because it did not have the primary effect 
of promoting religion.205 During that time, the Court treated religion as one 
viewpoint among many.206 As such, religion acted as a “co-equal partici-
pant” in American public life, and protection for religious speech became 
robust.207 
In the late 1960s, the Supreme Court provided equally robust protec-
tions for free exercise.208 The Free Exercise Clause came into its own in 
Sherbert in 1963, and then in Yoder in 1972.209 The Court held in both cases 
that significant burdens on free exercise, even if incidental, triggered a 
heightened level of review.210 
This changed several years later when the Rehnquist Court shifted to 
an emphasis on neutrality in Employment Division v. Smith.211 While the 
principle of neutrality strengthened protections for religious speech under 
the Free Speech Clause, it significantly weakened protections for free exer-
cise.212 As a result, religious litigants began looking to the Free Speech 
Clause for protection.213 
However, as Professor Thomas McCoy forcefully argued, the Court 
has not incorporated its more nuanced free speech jurisprudence into its free 
exercise jurisprudence.214 He argues that employing the Supreme Court’s 
more fully developed and nuanced standards for evaluating time, place, and 
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manner restrictions on speech provides a better approach for addressing Free 
Exercise Clause claims than the “doctrinal extremes” of applying the Sher-
bert compelling interest test, or the rational or sub-rational basis test from 
Smith.215 This approach should require courts to apply a version of interme-
diate scrutiny as opposed to strict scrutiny or rational basis. 
The courts have not caught up to Professor McCoy’s insights. Jurispru-
dence under the Free Exercise Clause is still underdeveloped. Thus, it makes 
sense for litigants to advance free speech claims rather than religious liberty 
claims. A key advantage to advancing a free speech claim is that there is a 
broader and more forceful neutrality principle in free speech jurisprudence 
than free exercise jurisprudence.216 Under the Free Speech Clause, for ex-
ample, the government must treat religious speech as equal to secular 
speech.217 In Smith, however, the Court opened the door to exemptions that 
would benefit the religious litigant.218 The resulting privilege may have left 
those statutes vulnerable to attack under the Establishment Clause.219 Thus, 
one advantage that the shift from free exercise to free speech offers is that 
the neutrality principle set forth in free speech jurisprudence better comports 
with the Establishment Clause. 
The shift also has other advantages. First, when a neutral law of general 
applicability interferes with the free exercise of religion, courts must apply 
the low level, rational basis inquiry under Smith.220 However, when a con-
tent neutral law interferes with religious speech, the court will apply inter-
mediate scrutiny.221 Thus, if a religious litigant can clear the initial hurdle, 
requiring her to prove that her religious practice is a form of expression, she 
will receive a heightened level of review.222 
Second, in order to gain protection under the Free Exercise Clause, a 
litigant must show that a law specifically targets religion.223 The Supreme 
Court of the United States has found only one example of this.224 Thus, free 
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exercise jurisprudence only allows a facial challenge to the law.225 To the 
contrary, a free speech claim, bolstered by the overbreadth doctrine, allows 
the religious claimant to mount an as-applied challenge to the law.226 In oth-
er words, the free speech doctrine does not require proof of “religious ger-
rymander[ing].”227 If the law incidentally restricts a substantial amount of 
protected expression, a court will invalidate the law.228 
Third, unlike the Free Exercise Clause (along with state RFRAs and 
RLUIPA), the Free Speech Clause protects religious speech regardless of 
the speaker’s sincerity or motives.229 A religious claimant does not have to 
prove the practice in question is central to a sincerely held belief.230 Both the 
“sincerity” test and the “substantial burden” test are absent from the free 
speech analysis.231 This eliminates a significant obstacle. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Religious litigants cannot depend on the hybrid rights exception for 
protection. The hybrid rights exception under the Free Exercise Clause is 
unworkable because courts have not developed a clear definition and appli-
cation of the exception that substantially differs from outright rejection. So, 
whether a court accepts a hybrid rights theory or not, it will treat the hybrid 
rights claim essentially the same: (1) if a free exercise/parental rights case 
resembles Yoder, the claimant will receive a heightened level of review; or 
(2) if the free exercise right is combined with any other constitutional pro-
tection, the companion claim will dictate the level of review. 
In the twenty-three years since Smith, the Supreme Court has remained 
silent on hybrid rights. Perhaps the Smith Court never intended to create a 
substantive exception. It merely used hybrid rights to reach its desired result. 
And, one might argue that the exception still sits where the Supreme Court 
left it, despite efforts to develop it. 
Though the hybrid rights exception is unworkable, litigants still have 
avenues to advance religious liberty claims. In many cases, individuals turn 
to statutory claims under RFRA, RLUIPA, or a state RFRA. The reality is 
that there is greater statutory protection for free exercise claims than under 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Furthermore, in many 
cases, the Free Speech Clause will provide necessary protection. Character-
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izing free exercise as free speech has three main advantages: (1) the neutrali-
ty principle set forth in free speech jurisprudence better comports with the 
Establishment Clause; (2) under free speech, courts will subject content neu-
tral laws that interfere with religious speech to intermediate scrutiny; (3) 
free speech doctrine does not limit religious claimants to facial challenges to 
the law; and (4) courts do not subject free speech litigants to a “sincerity” 
test or to a “substantial burden” test. 
As advocates of religious freedom look for protection elsewhere, they 
will likely have to choose whether to pursue religious freedom through stat-
utory exemptions or through free speech, because one pursuit may under-
mine the progress made by the other.232 Such a choice requires advocates to 
decide whether the principle of neutrality, as set forth in free speech juris-
prudence, is one worth preserving. If so, the path to religious freedom is 
clear, and must be sought through free speech jurisprudence. 
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